China Sea under Xi Jinping on United States (US) and Australian foreign policy. The essay focuses on the Xi Jinping period from 2013 because Xi has a different approach in foreign policy making from that of his predecessors. His determination to defend and advance maritime claims and interests as well as the external developments, have made his foreign policy more assertive. This essay will argue that China's assertive foreign policy in the South China Sea under Xi Jinping has paved the way for a greater role for the US in Southeast Asia, and deepened the rivalry between China and the US. This rising tension in turn has put Australia in a challenging situation, torn between its security alliance with the US, and its economic interests in China. However, Australia does not have to choose one, but Australia can play a constructive role in the development of some compromise between the two.
Introduction
The South China Sea (SCS) dispute is an unresolved territorial problem in the Asia Pacific region. The dispute has escalated in recent years, especially since 2009 when Malaysia and Vietnam jointly submitted information to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (nm). 1 One day later, Vietnam made a national submission regarding the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nm from the baselines of Vietnam. For China, these actions represented a violation of Article 5 of the 2002 Declaration of Code of Conduct (DoC) regarding efforts to refrain from doing activities that could escalate the conflict. The DoC is an agreement between China and the Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN), which paved the way for a seven year period of peace between the SCS claimants which include China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam. The 2002-2009 period after the signing of the DoC was a period of peace in the SCS, which was remarked by no significant incidents between conflicting parties during this period. However, after 2009, a few incidents (as discussed later) happened at sea, especially between China and Vietnam, and China and the Philippines, reigniting tensions.
As a response to Vietnam and Malaysia submissions, China then responded by submitting a verbal note to the United Nations, and attaching its ‚Ushaped Line‛. 2 2 China also responded to Vietnam's declaration over the Paracels and Spratlys in its National Law of Sea by establishing a new city, Sansha, in July 2012, a city that would have jurisdiction over the Paracels, Spratlys, and Macclesfield Bank. Two months later, in November 2012, China issued a new version of its passport which contains a map of China that includes the U-shaped Line. J Zhang, 'China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea A Strategic Shift?', National Security College, retrieved 20 May 2015, <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/occasional-5brief-4.pdf>. For China, sovereignty claims over the four island groups in the SCS, the Pratas Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank and the Spratly Islands, derive from its historical rights as the first country that discovered, named, and continuously used these islands for more than two centuries. 3 Accordingly, for China, no other claimant states in the SCS have sufficient evidence to support claims of sovereignty over the islands. 4 After China declared its ‚ninedashed line‛ 5 in 1953, there was neither opposition from the international community nor diplomatic protest against China from neighboring countries. Therefore, in China's view, the ‚ninedashed line‛ had been approved and recognized by the international community. 6 2012 was the first time the map delineating China's claims had been officially published since 1948. As argued by Jian Zhang, this action has been perceived by many as an indication of China's growing assertiveness in regard to the SCS dispute. 7 Indeed, since Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, he put ‚safeguarding the country's sovereignty and security, and defending our territorial integrity‛ 8 as high priorities. Subsequently, China's foreign policy in the SCS has become more assertive.
Furthermore, 2009 also marked the beginning of the involvement of external powers in the SCS dispute, especially the US. By signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), US indicated its strategic 'pivot' towards the Asia Pacific. The US intended to play a greater role in the region, particularly in the SCS dispute, on behalf of its commitment to its allies in South East Asia, especially the Philippines. The US position raises questions regarding Australia's position, another US security ally in the Asia Pacific. determination to defend and advance its maritime claims and interests‛ 14 and clearly sends a message that China will protect its core interests. 15 However, this is not a new policy because protection of maritime rights and interests was addressed in China's Twelfth Five-Year Plan in March 2011. 16 China's core national interests have driven China's foreign policy, with domestic political stability also related to foreign policy. 17 These core national interests include sovereignty, territorial integrity, and sustainable socio-economic development. The report of the 18th CCP Congress of 2012, a guide for the next five years, emphasized the importance of protecting these interests and sovereign rights of China, and of not surrendering to outside pressure. The 18 th CCP Congress also reclassified the South China Sea as a ‚core national interest‛. 18 Xi Jinping also put nationalism, patriotism and pride, at the centre of his leadership. 19 As argued by Huang, Xi Jinping realized that nationalism is a powerful notion in Chinese society. 20 China's grand new strategy certainly attracted international attention, especially 14 First, China actively conducts military exercises in the SCS in order to strengthen its claims. Also, China regularly sends patrol boats to the area, and has even built military posts and airstrips on some islands. In December 2013, China sent its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, to the SCS. These moves heightened regional tensions, especially following China's unilateral declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone/ADIZ in the East China Sea. Some people worried that China would make a similar declaration regarding the SCS. 21 Second, the 2014 placement of the Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig at a location within Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) triggered massive anti-Chinese protests in Hanoi. 22 After nearly two months, on July 16, 2014, the China National Petroleum Corp finally shut down the rig and moved it closer to Hainan Island in southern China. 21 A Panda, 'One Year of ADIZ: What Next for China?', The Diplomat, 27 November 2014, retrieved 20 May 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/one-yearof-adiz-what-next-for-china/>. 22 At least 1000 people took to the street protests against the Chinese actions. This unrest not only attacked the Chinese passport workers, but also destroyed and looted Chinese-owned companies and factories which were operating in Vietnam. More than 3,000 Chinese nationals were evacuated from some parts of Vietnam after riots since mid-May 2014. The Chinese Foreign Ministry immediately responded by evacuating its citizens and did not allow its citizens to travel to Vietnam.
Third, China has carried out extensive land reclamation projects in the SCS. However, Article 121 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) declares that submerged features (such as shoals) cannot be claimed by any party and that ‚rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf‛ 23 . China is now building new islands on five different reefs and is creating conditions to sustain human habitation to bolster its claims. 24 In January 2014, a massive land reclamation was done at Johnson South Reef. 25 Second, Xi Jinping wants to define his leadership by reasserting China's core interests and nationalism. Xi has great influence in the foreign policy making process. As argued by Huang, Xi is a very different leader from his predecessor, Hu Jintao, as ‚Xi's style is more like a strongman leader‛. 32 Xi is the first member of the Politburo, 33 the elite group of the CCP which consists of seven people and which oversees China's policy-making (primus inter pares). President Xi leads a number of committees that deal with different aspects of foreign and security policy and he has a decisive voice. 34 Third, as a result of the increasing global influence of China, the number of domestic actors involved in the foreign policy making process has increased. Besides the Politburo and party organs, there are also financial and business groups, regional and city bosses, the media (conventional and modern), research institutes, the People Liberation Army (PLA) and branches of the armed forces. 35 ‚The US takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty over the various island, reefs, atolls, and cays in the South China Sea‛. The United States would, however, view with serious concern any maritime claim or restriction on maritime activity in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS. 39 The United States has consistently used the issue of freedom of navigation as its primary reason for showing interest in the South China Sea. Since the 'pivot' in 2009, the United States consistently has raised this issue at annual ARF Meetings. In 2011, at the first East Asia Summit (EAS) attended by US President Barack Obama, the US restated its previous position that it 38 takes no position in the dispute, but that freedom of navigation is its core interest. 40 However, according to Fravel, the US has two principal interests in the South China Sea. First is the freedom of navigation. Here the US refers to Articles 87 of the UNCLOS, which declares that ‚The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: (a) freedom of navigation; ...‛. 41 The US asserts it has legitimate economic and military interests in freedom of navigation in the SCS. According to Glaser, more than US 1 trillion dollars' worth of the US trade comes through the SCS every year. 42 In addition, US naval vessels from the US West Coast and Japan pass through the South China Sea on their way to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. The second principal US interest is peace and stability in Southeast Asia region. This relates to trade and economic development -any disruption to the security of sea-lanes in the SCS would affect cross-border trade and investment. 43 The United States has raised these principal interests in the SCS since it poses several security threats. According to Fravel, US reconnaissance plane and a Chinese jet fighter collided 44 , China has tried to restrict US military activities in this zone, especially regarding surveillance and reconnaissance. Furthermore, the modernization of the PLA Navy poses a challenge to US Naval vessels in the SCS. 45 Accordingly, in light of these security threats in the SCS, Fravel also argued that the US has to maintain three interests: ‚its commitments to allies in the region, its stable and cooperative relations with China, and finally its neutrality regarding the sovereignty of land features‛. 46 Therefore, the US's support to the Philippines can be put in the context of the US commitment to its ally. The Philippines, one of the claimant states in the South China Sea dispute, is a US ally based on the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. Article VI provides the mechanism for the two countries to respond if there is an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific, or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific. 47 The disagreement between ASEAN member countries is actually unfavorable for regional security, and as argued by Emmers, has reduced the strategic benefits which are provided by US rebalancing strategy in Southeast Asia, 51 something that is not desirable for the US from its greater involvement in the Southeast Asia region since regional peace and stability in Southeast Asia is one of the principal US interests in the SCS.
Australia's Interests in the South China Sea
‚It shows the United States can say a lot about regional prosperity but doesn't do much. China only says some things, but does a lot.‛ 52
It has been argued that Australia has no direct interests in the South China Sea. But, since Australia has a security alliance with the United States, has close economic relations with China, and is a member of both the ARF and EAS, the South China Sea dispute does have an impact on Australia's strategic considerations and interests regarding regional stability. Furthermore, Australia's 2013 Defense White Paper clearly stated that: ‚Australia has interests in the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes including in the South China Sea in accordance with international law, the prevention of aggression within Southeast Asia, and freedom of navigation and maritime security in the region's sea lanes‛. 53 Therefore, a peaceful SCS is in Australia's interests, particularly as Australia's extensive shipping trade with East Asia passes through this region. 54 Australia and the United States have a security treaty entitled the Australia New Zealand United States (ANZUS) Treaty, signed on 1 September 1951. The focus of this treaty is the security guarantee provided to Australia by the US, although this guarantee does not seem to be as explicit as the one relating to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 55 The ANZUS treaty involves not only security guarantees for Australia, but also provides Australia access to US intelligence and military technologies that it could not Lowy Institute Paper, No. 8, 2005, pp. 16-17. produce itself. 56 In addition, as Kelton argues, the ANZUS alliance enhances the prospects of Australian influence in the region which benefits Australia's long-term interests. 57 However, as a consequence, the US almost certainly expects diplomatic and military support from Australia in any major US maritime military measures in East or South East Asia. 58 Australia has previously proved its commitment to the alliance by joining major US military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The US has clearly committed itself to a rebalance of power in the South East Asian region, making commitments regarding the security of South East Asian allies involved in the South China Sea dispute. There are questions, however, about the extent to which Australia would support the US in an East Asian conflict.
As mentioned, in the 2013 Defense White Paper, Australia strongly supports the continued engagement and enhanced presence of the United States in South East Asia. However, that does not necessarily mean that Australia would militarily support the US in any South China Sea dispute. Australia may be confronted with a situation similar to when President Bush declared China as a strategic competitor, but Prime Minister John Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer did not follow US's China Policies. 59 Australia chose to play its own strategy, choosing to actively support the US in 56 Science, Vol. 45, No. 1, March 2010, p. 20. ‚seems to be always saved‛ by the international occurrence. Therefore, as they quoted from Horne (1965) , ‚a country that has never had to weather the full impact of an international challenge is not disposed to think hard about the future‛. 62 64 For China, as stated in the Beijing Review, this White Paper was just an excuse for Australia to increase its military budget, and to assure the US that Australia would not further its relations with China. 65 In the 2013 Defense White Paper, four key Australian strategic goals are identified: a secure Australia, a secure South Pacific and Timor Leste, a stable Indo-Pacific 66 , and a stable, rules-based global order. The paper acknowledged that the security of South East Asia is central to a stable Indo-Pacific region. Australia has for some time engaged with South East Asia for such security reasons. Partnership. 68 Clearly, South East Asia is recognized as part of Australia's strategic interests. The 2009 Defense White Paper did mention that ‚a secure and stable Southeast Asia is in Australia's strategic interests‛. 69 Therefore, it is not surprising that Australia chooses to support ASEAN's view regarding the proposal for a multilateral CoC in the SCS.
Nonetheless

The Impacts of China's Assertiveness on the US and Australian Foreign Policy
China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea has had an impact on US and Australian foreign policy. First of all, it seems to have prompted a shift in US policy, one toward greater involvement in the Southeast Asia. At the same time, the South East Asia countries have welcomed 67 Third, the more assertive China foreign policy in the South China Sea has caused a dilemma for Australia. Since the risk of conflict between the US and China is rising, as argued by Dupont, ‚Australia could be drawn into the unresolved territorial dispute in the South China Sea‛. 74 Although the potential for war is low, the deteriorating situation may in the future force Australia to choose between its security ally and its major trading partner. 75 Finally, Australia cannot avoid foreign policy ambiguity and pragmatism in regards to the increasing rivalry between the US and China. The ambiguity can be seen in the 2013 Defence White Paper which did not offer any clues regarding the extent to which Australia might play a role, even a minor one, in reducing strategic tensions between the US and China. 76 This position is based on the desire not to disrupt key relationships. Australia is happy with the status quo. Consequently, on the one hand, Australia would like to maintain its alliance 73 R Emmers, op.cit. 74 A Dupont, op.cit. 75 Ibid. 76 J Lee, 'Australia's 2015 Defence White Paper: Seeking Strategic Opportunities in Southeast Asia to Help Manage China's Peaceful Rise ', Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2013, pp. 395-422. commitment with the United States, while not explicitly offending China. On the other hand, Australia would like to support the ASEAN goal of a multilateral CoC in the SCS, thereby possibly offending China. This ambiguity and pragmatism, argues Griffiths, seems to show that Australia cannot have independent foreign policies. 77 The best thing Australia can do is avoiding collision, especially in its relations with the US and China, while at the same time play a constructive role in the development of some compromise between the US and China. In agreement with the idea of ‚A Concert of Asia‛, as proposed by White, which could engage Asia's great powers, such the US, China, Japan, and India, Australia can play a role in this framework. As White argues, this order ‚would maintain the greatest strategic role for America in Asia while also maintaining peaceful US-China relations... [which] also best preserves Australia's alliance with America‛. 78
Conclusion
The external dynamics of South China Sea dispute and domestic consideration of Xi Jinping's leadership to define the rules of its presidency has made Xi's policies seem to be more assertive. However, these developments have impacted on the US and Australian foreign policy. First, it seems to have prompted a shift in US policy toward greater 77 M Griffiths, 'US-China Relations: Should Australia Be Worried?', Professionals' Lecture Series, Flinders University, 26 May, 2015. 78 Hugh White, 'Powershift: Rethinking Australia's Place in the Asian Century', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 1, 2011, pp. 81-93. involvement in the Southeast Asia. Second, it has deepened the rivalry between the US and China. Third, it has caused a dilemma for Australia between its security ally and its major trading partner. Finally, the increasing rivalry between the US and China leads Australia into foreign policy ambiguity and pragmatism.
These impacts basically reveal that this dispute is not only about China and other claimant states. Therefore, China only has at least two best options: achieve the win-win solution multilaterally by using ASEAN mechanism and its economic leverage; or maintain the status quo without pushing the claim assertively. Then, the US and Australian foreign policy could lead China into this way.
